State aid to financial institutions - the EU and EEA approach by Pedersen, Karina Fossmark
  
 
 
State aid to financial institutions - 
the EU and EEA approach 
 
Changes and challenges during the financial crisis 
 
Date: 12.12.2011 
Student number: 174102 
Teaching Supervisor: Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen 
Words: 14911 
 
1 
 
Index 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 3 
1.1 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, BANKS AND STATE AID .................................... 3 
1.2 AIMS AND PURPOSES ...................................................................................... 5 
1.3 METHOD AND MATERIAL .............................................................................. 6 
1.4 DELIMITATION .................................................................................................. 7 
2 STATE AID TO BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ...................................................... 9 
2.1 STATE AID – THE GENERAL RULES ............................................................. 9 
2.1.1 ARTICLE 107(1) TFEU ...................................................................................... 9 
 Transfer of State resources ................................................................................... 9 
 Economic Advantage ......................................................................................... 10 
 Selectivity ........................................................................................................... 10 
 Effect on competition and on trade .................................................................... 10 
2.1.2 ARTICLE 107 (2) AND (3) TFEU .................................................................... 10 
2.1.3 ARTICLE 108 TFEU ......................................................................................... 11 
2.1.4 OTHER RULES APPLICABLE TO STATE AID............................................. 12 
2.2 STATE AID AND BANKS – ABANDONING THE TRADITIONAL 
APPROACH ....................................................................................................... 12 
2.3 GRANTING AIR TO REMEDY A SERIOUS DISTURBANCE IN THE 
ECONOMY ........................................................................................................ 15 
 Article 107(3)(b) ................................................................................................ 15 
 Additional criterions ......................................................................................... 17 
 Applicability of the article .................................................................................. 18 
2.3.1 GUIDELINES AND COMMUNICATIONS .................................................... 19 
The Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring  
Firms in Difficulty…. ......................................................................................... 19 
2 
 
 Crisis Communications ...................................................................................... 22 
3.  THE AIM TO COUNTER DISTORTION OF COMPETITION .................................. 25 
3.1 COMPETITION, STATE AID AND BANKS ................................................... 25 
3.2 BALANCING COMPETITION AND STATE AID .......................................... 26 
Appropriateness: is the aid measure aimed at achieving a well-defined 
objective of common interest……….. ............................................................... 27 
 Necessity; is there an incentive effect and is the aid amounted proportional?... 31 
3.2.1 LIMITING THE DISTORTION OF COMPETITION ...................................... 34 
 Proportionality – is the overall balance positive? .............................................. 35 
 Dexia bank .......................................................................................................... 36 
 Norther Rock ...................................................................................................... 37 
3.2.2 CORRECTING UNDUE DISTORTION OF COMPETITION ........................ 39 
 Lack of prior notification ................................................................................... 39 
 In-depth investigation ......................................................................................... 39 
 Recovery of the aid ............................................................................................ 40 
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS .......................................................................................... 41 
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 44 
5.1 LAW.................................................................................................................... 44 
5.2 LITTERATURE.................................................................................................. 45 
5.3 EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY ........................................................... 49 
5.4 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION .................................................................... 50 
5.5 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ..................................... 54 
5.6 VARIOUS SOURCES ........................................................................................ 54 
 
3 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, BANKS AND STATE AID1 
 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, an American investment bank, on 15 September 2008 
has detonated a chain reaction that has brought several European banks at the verge of 
collapse.  It did so by arousing a breakdown in investor confidence that quickly transmitted 
throughout the system.  Banks lost access to liquidity as interbank lending and wholesale 
funding markets dried up.  The lack of required liquidity to shore-up reserves and offset 
mounting losses resulted in several leading European financial institutions, such as Dexia, 
Fortis and ING, within days tilted on the edge of insolvency
2
. 
 
Interlinked with the collapse of Lehman we see that entire countries found themselves in an 
economic struggle, providing the breeding ground for the financial crisis.  Throughout 
Europe there was a drastic drop in gross domestic product (“GDP”) growth, leaving all of the 
EU and EEA countries with a negative GDP growth for 2009.  At the same time the ratios of 
government debts in many countries were very high, and still growing.   
 
Looking at Iceland, which faced severe financial difficulties in 2008 and 2009, we find that 
their annual budget deficit increased from 10.3 % of GDP in 2007 to 79.7% in 2010
3
, in the 
same period as their GDP growth of 6.0% in 2007 fell to a dramatic -6.9% in 2009 and ended 
on -4% in 2010
4
.  Greece on the other hand, which is currently in serious economic 
difficulties, had a negative growth of -13.6 % of GDP in 2009 and -10.6 % in 2010.  In the 
same period their government deficit has increased from a high 115 % of GDP to a sky-high 
144.9% in 2010, leaving them incapable of managing their debts without foreign support.  
Italy is also facing serious financial struggles with a current government deficit of 120 % of 
                                                          
1
 In this paper, banks and financial institutions will be used interchangeably 
2
 Doleys, p.1 
3
 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3396.htm 
4
http://www.statice.is/?PageID=1267&src=/temp_en/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=THJ01702%26ti=Annual+GDP+vol
ume+growth+1980-
2010%26path=../Database/thjodhagsreikningar/landsframleidsla_althj/%26lang=1%26units=Percent 
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GDP; on the borderline of what they can manage alone
5
.  If Italy does not fulfill their debts it 
is likely to have a grave impact on banks around Europe, especially German and French 
banks which own respectively 48.338 and 44.657 million euro of Italian debts
6
. 
 
Despite the efforts of the EU and EEA member States and of international financial 
institutions, such as the European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund, the 
financial crisis intensified markedly throughout 2008 and 2009, forcing governments to act 
quickly and aggressively.  Still today the crisis is on-going.  The prognoses for the banking 
sector in 2011 were, in the beginning of the year, better than that of 2010, this has however 
changed and banks are currently facing financial difficulties in many European countries
7
. 
 
The economic situation has threatened and is still threatening the existence of individual 
financial institutions as their weaknesses, which often are a result of their particular business 
model or business practices, are exposed and intensified by the crisis in the financial markets.  
A wide-ranging restructuring of their operations cannot be avoided if these institutions are to 
be returned to long-term viability
8
.  Because of the severity of the crisis, fundamentally sound 
banks are also being affected as they are facing restricted access to liquidity. 
 
As a result, enormous sums of State aid has been issued in the form of loans, guarantees, 
recapitalisation and underwriting of toxic assets to banks in both EU and EEA.  In the EU 
alone, an amount equivalent to 36.7% of EU-27 GDP - €4.506.5 billion - has been made 
available for banks in crisis aid through national schemes and ad hoc interventions between 
October 2008 and October 2011.  “The bulk of the aid was authorized in 2008, when € 
3457 billion” were approved, mainly in form of guarantee9. 
 
This paper will deal with the legal changes adopted, during the financial crisis, on the access 
to grant such aid to banks and financial institutions.  To be able to address the situation with 
appropriate measures, the European Commission (the “Commission”) has temporarily 
                                                          
5
 Provision of deficit and debt data, 2009 http://ep.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-22042010-
BP/EN/2-22042010-BP-EN.PDF and provision of deficit and debt data, 2010 
http://ep.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-21102011-AP/EN/2-21102011-AP-EN.PDF  
6
 El País ¿Y si cae Italia?, November 13, 2011 p. 6 
7
 For more information see The Economist; “Banks in central Europe, The ghost of Christmas past” and ”The 
euro crisis, The screw tightens”  
8
 Banking Communication p.1 
9
 2011 State Aid Score Board, chapter 3 
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changed the legal provision to which they authorized aid to banks.  The new provision, Article 
107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( “TFEU”), allows the 
granting of State aid necessary to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State”10.  Following the Commission’s lead, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (the 
“Authority”) also authorized the granting of aids to the banks in Norway, Iceland and 
Lichtenstein, on the basis of Article 61(3)(b) of the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area (the “EEA Agreement”) which mirrors the formulation of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. 
 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement have virtually never been 
used in the past, but all State aid granted to financial institutions after the 13 October 2008, 
have been authorized by the Commission and the Authority
11
 on the basis of the exceptions 
provided by these provisions
12
. 
 
Between 13 October 2008, and 11 December 2011, Article 107(3)(b) TFEU has served as the 
legal basis for 399 decisions adopted by the Commission.  284 of these decisions have 
authorized, prolonged or amended schemes
13
, 76 have been ad hoc cases
14
, and 39 individual 
case
15
.  Financial crisis measures were authorized in 23 of the 27 EU member States.  Only 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Malta have not granted aid to their financial 
institutions.   
 
The Authority has also made a number of decisions under Article 61(3)(b) EEA regard aid 
schemes and individual aid measures in favour of banks and insurance companies, the vast 
majority of these decisions have regarded Icelandic banks, where they also have a number of 
pending decisions.   
 
1.2  AIMS AND PURPOSES 
 
                                                          
10
 The article applied in September 2008 was in fact Article 87 of the Treaty on the establishing of the European 
Community “EC”, and not Article 107 TFEU.  With effect from 1 December 2009, Article 87 of the EC Treaty 
became Article 107 TFEU; the two sets of provisions are identical in substance.  To accommodate the reader, 
this text will refer only to Article 107 TFEU, also when the correct article would be Article87 EC. 
11
 The Authority adopted the equivalent to the Banking Communication on 29 January 2009 
12
 Gilliams, p. 7 
13
 Acts on basis of which individual aid may be awarded without notifying 
14
 Aid not awarded through a scheme 
15
 Aid awarded through an approved scheme but has to be notified 
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The purpose of this thesis is to address the access to grant State aid to banks and financial 
institutions under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and the identical Article 61(3)(b) EEA.  The aim is 
to analyse the legal changes made between the fall of 2008 and today, and thereafter to 
discuss whether the change of legal frame has open up for a wider acceptance for distortion of 
competition. 
 
This paper is structured as follows; Part 2 will deal with the legal developments, reviewing 
the temporary change of legal provision for State aid to banks, from Article 107(3)(c) TFEU 
and Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.  Part 3 will mainly focus on competition issues in relation to the 
application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, stating with a discussion on how the criterions for 
applicability, appropriateness, necessity and proportionality have been applied.  We will also 
look at the balance between State aid and competition and discuss what impact the new 
provision has had on distortion of competition.   
 
1.3 METHOD AND MATERIAL 
 
This thesis is based on EEA and EU law only, and will not address national law.  Pursuant to 
Article 7 of the EEA Agreement, the EEA Agreement is binding upon the EU Member States 
and the EFTA States
16
.  In accordance with Article 6 of the EEA Agreement and Article 3(2) 
of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority 
and a Court of Justice (“SCA”), the EU Member States and the EFTA States are committed to 
place emphasis on the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) in their 
interpretation of the EEA agreement, meaning that judgments from both the EU Courts and 
the EFTA Court are relevant when interpreting State aid rules in the EEA legal system
17
.  The 
TFEU on the other hand is binding upon the EU Member States only
18
, and the ECJ face no 
obligation to interpret EU law in conformity with the EFTA court. 
 
On account of the large number of decisions it has been necessary to be selective.  The thesis 
is therefore primarily based on a few interesting decisions from the Authority and the 
Commission.  It will also focus on the Commission “crisis communications”; the banking 
                                                          
16
 The term EFTA States in this text refer to Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway 
17
 Alterskjær et.al,  p. 23 
18
 Cf. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) Article 1 
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communication
19
, the recapitalisation communication
20
, the impaired assets communication
21
 
and the bank restructuring communication
22
, in addition to the two communications 
prolonging the timeframe to 2011 and 2012
23
 and the equivalent notifications from the 
Authority
24
. 
 
Although guidelines and communications are considered “soft-law”, the EU courts have 
repeatedly stressed that the Commission is bound by its own guidelines/communications
25
.  
Since the Commission also decides which aid measures are compatible with Article 107 
TFEU, the communications are important when discussion the provision.   
 
The Authority is entrusted with the equivalent powers and similar functions to those of the 
Commission in the field of State aid.  This includes that both material and procedural rules 
applicable to the Commission apply also to the Authority through the EEA Agreement
26
.   As 
EEA rules on State aid are modeled on those provided in the TFEU, we will focus on the 
description of EU rules on State aid and point-out the differences vis-à-vis the EEA system 
when appropriate. 
 
1.4 DELIMITATION 
 
The State aid policies include a legal, political and a strong economic aspect.  The discussions 
and analysis of this thesis are legal in nature and will not take in to account whether the 
choices made by the European Commission and the Authority are politically or financially 
sound.  Even so, State aid is a legal area where politics and economy plays a very important 
role, which makes it impossible to do a legal analysis without discussing the political and 
financial motives.  Political and economic issues will therefore be considered when relevant.   
 
                                                          
19 OJ C 270, 5.10.2008  
20
 OJ C 10, 15.1.2009 
21
 OJ C 72, 26.03.2009 
22 OJ C 195/9, 19.08.2009 
23
 OJ C 329/7, 7.12.2010 and C(2011) 8744 final, 01.12.2011 
24
  The Authority has adopted five Guidelines equivalent to those of the Commission, see Decision 28/09/COL, 
Decision 191/09/COL, Decision 28/09/COL and Decision 57/11/COL 
25
 See T-119/02 Royal Philips Electronics v Commission [2003] ECR II-1433, para. 242 and T-91/03 Tokai 
Carbon v Commission [2005] ECR II-10, para.  157 
26
 Cf. Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement. 
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Furthermore, it is important to realize that during the worldwide economic crisis a number of 
non-European banks received government aid from jurisdictions, like the US, that does not 
have rules comparable to the EEA and EU State aid rules.  That such aid has been granted 
outside the EU and EEA has resulted in a significant political pressure for the Commission 
and the Authority to operate in the same way
27
.   
 
Finally, this thesis will only discuss legal issues raised as a consequence of the legal changes 
made during the financial crisis.  Questions regarding State aid measures to banks and 
financial institutions not related to the financial crisis will not be addressed. 
 
                                                          
27
 Gilliams,  p.4 
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2 STATE AID TO BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
2.1 STATE AID – THE GENERAL RULES 
The “constitutional” foundations for EEA and EU State aid policy are set forth in Articles 61 
and 62
28
 of the EEA Agreement and Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, respectively.   Article 61 of 
the EEA Agreement and 107 TFEU establish the substantive rules while Articles 62 of the 
EEA Agreement and 108 TFEU set the procedural rules.    
2.1.1 ARTICLE 107(1) TFEU 
Looking first at the substantive rules, Article 107(1) TFEU establishes that State aid is in 
principle incompatible with the internal market.   In order for a measure to qualify as State 
aid, four cumulative criteria need to be satisfied, the aid must: 
‒ involve the transfer of State resources; 
‒ provide an economic advantage; 
‒ be selective; 
‒ affect competition and trade between Member States 
Transfer of State resources  
In order for a measure to be considered as State aid it must imply the transfer of financial 
resources to the receiver and such resources must be imputable directly or indirectly to the 
State (including national, regional or local authorities, public banks and foundations, etc.).   
Furthermore, the aid does not necessarily need to be granted by the State itself.  It may also be 
granted by a private or public intermediate body appointed by the State
29
.   The notion of aid 
is rather broad and includes guarantees, loans as well as other forms of equity interventions, 
such as accelerated depreciation allowances, capital injections, tax exemptions, provided that 
represent an economic advantage for the receiver. 
                                                          
28
 Cf Article 1, Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement 
29
 Case C-379/98 DPAG, para 63 and C-482/99,  Stardust-case 
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Economic Advantage 
The aid must constitute an economic advantage that the receiver would not have obtained in 
the normal course of business. 
Selectivity 
The measure should be selective, i.e.  aimed at favoring only certain undertakings and thus 
changing the balance between the receivers of the aid and their competitors.   This criterion 
allows distinguishing State aid from so-called “general measures”, i.e.  measures which apply 
to all firms in all economic sectors in a certain member State.  The assessment of whether or 
not a measure is selective can be rather complex, however as this analysis has not been 
problematic in the review of aid granted to the banking sector during the financial crisis, as 
these “[m]easures are clearly selective as it only concerns the banking sector”30.  This will 
thus no longer be discussed in this thesis. 
Effect on competition and on trade 
The final criteria mentioned in article 107(1) TFEU is that the aid must distort competition 
and affect trade between member States.   In order for this criteria to be satisfied, the 
Commission is not “required … to establish that the aid has a real effect on trade between 
Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether 
that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition”31. 
2.1.2 ARTICLE 107 (2) AND (3) TFEU 
As mentioned above, aid measures that satisfy the criteria discussed in section 2.1.1 are in 
principle incompatible with the internal market.   However this does not mean that all State 
aid is prohibited.   Article 107 (2) and (3) provide a list of cases in which State aid can be 
acceptable (“exceptions”).   As far as the banking sector is concerned, aid was traditionally 
approved on the basis of Article 107 (3)(c) which  refers to “aid to facilitate the development 
of certain economic activities or certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely 
affect trading  conditions contrary to the common interest.” 
                                                          
30
 Irish Guarantee scheme  NN 48/2008 Para 47 
31
 Case C-372/97, Italy v. Commission, [2004] ECR I-3679 para 44, Case C-66/02, Italy v. Commission, [2005] 
ECR-I10901, para 111  
11 
 
As discussed in greater detail below in section 2.3, following the worsening of the financial 
crisis, aid to banks and financial institutions has been assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU 
which, among other, allows the granting of aid “to remedy a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State”. 
2.1.3 ARTICLE 108 TFEU 
Turning now to the procedural rules, pursuant to Article 108 TFEU the supervision of State 
aid is conducted by the Commission and is based on a system of ex ante authorization.   
Member States are required to inform the Commission of any plan to establish or modify a 
State aid scheme and are not allowed to put such aid into effect before it has been authorized 
by the Commission - this is the so-called “standstill-principle”32.  The Commission is 
competent to determine whether or not the notified aid measure constitutes State aid pursuant 
to Article 107 (1) TFEU, and if it does, whether or not it qualifies for exemption under Article 
107 (2) or (3) TFEU. 
As mentioned above, member States cannot grant State aid that has not been notified and 
authorized by the Commission.  Any aid, which is granted without the Commission’s 
approval, is automatically classified as “unlawful aid” and the Commission is obliged to order 
the recovery from the beneficiaries of any unlawful aid that is found to be incompatible with 
the internal market. 
When examining a notified aid scheme, the Commission will conduct a preliminary analysis 
at the end of which it decide (i) not to raise objections, (ii) open a formal investigation or (iii) 
request additional information.  A measure will be cleared if it does not involve State aid, or if 
the proposed aid is compatible with the internal market.  As part of the formal investigation, 
the Commission will invite comments from the State seeking to implement the measure as 
well as from other interested parties, such as a proposed aid recipient and its competitors.  A 
formal investigation can end with the approval of the measure, its prohibition or its approval 
subject to conditions. 
                                                          
32
 TFEU Article 108(3) last sentence and the EEA Agreement Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3,. 
However, aid falling under the scope of the Commission’s block exemption regulation, cf. [2008] OJ L 214/3, or 
that is de minimis, meaning not exceeding 200.000 € does not need to be notified, cf. [2006] OJ L 379/5 Article 
2.  The Commission and the Authority increased the de minimis between October 2008 and December 2010 from 
200.000 € to 500.000 € with notification.  This opened up for larger risk of distortion of competition as States 
could inject more aid in banks without the surveillance of the Commission and the Authority to limit potential 
distortion. 
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To enforce the rules, the Authority and the Commission can require the Member States to 
provide relevant information, to carry out on-site inspections and to order repayment of any 
aid paid in breach of the rules, together with interest.  A Member State (the recipient or their 
competitors) and the Commission may also obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to 
whether an aid measure is compatible with the Treaty
33
. 
2.1.4 OTHER RULES APPLICABLE TO STATE AID 
 
The provisions of the TFEU are not the only source of rules applicable to State aids.  Over 
time, the Commission has developed in fact specific approaches to the assessment of State aid 
which depend on the size of the beneficiary, its location, the industry concerned, the purpose 
of the aid, etc.  The Commission has made public the criteria it uses when deciding whether 
aid measures notified to it qualify for exemption.  These publications have taken various 
forms, including regulations, “communications”, “notices”, “frameworks”, “guidelines”, and 
letters to member States. 
During the financial crisis, the Commission has made extensive use of its ability to adopt 
communications, i.e. documents that operates as guidelines as to how the Commission will 
interpret the TFEU, and that are legally binding upon the Commission but not upon the 
Member States.   The Authority, like the Commission, has the power to adopt 
communications that are legally binding only upon the Authority and that indicate how the 
Authority will interpret the EEA Agreement.  The Authority will follow the Commission’s 
lead and adopt communications that differ from those of the Commission only for some 
linguistic adjustments.  The Authority’s communications are then published on its webpage. 
 
2.2 STATE AID AND BANKS – ABANDONING THE TRADITIONAL 
APPROACH 
 
In July 2007, Kreditanstalt fur Wideraufbau, a German State owned bank, granted a € 26 
billion loan to two German banks in financial difficulties, IKB
34
 and Sachsen LB
35
.  Later the 
same year, the British bank Northern Rock received emergency liquidity from the Bank of 
                                                          
33
 Cf. Article 218 § 11 TFEU 
34
 C 10/2008, Restructuring Aid to IKB, [2008] OJ C 76/2008 
35
 C 9/2008, Restructuring aid to Sachsen LB, [2008] OJ C 71/2008 
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England
36
.  German and UK banks however were not the only ones struggling to survive the 
financial crisis, the Danish bank Roskilde
37
, was bailed-out by the Danish State in the 
beginning of 2008. 
 
As it can be easily understood from the few examples mention, when Lehman Brothers went 
bust in September of 2008 the financial crisis was already producing its effects in Europe.  
However, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers accelerated and amplified the effects of the 
financial crisis.  Prior to September 2008 no one had pictured that a bank of such size and 
importance “could” go bankrupt, its collapse thus resulted in a number of European 
governments pushing to intervene with bail-outs, guarantees and/or recapitalisation to avoid 
the collapse of their banking system.   
 
Faced with a crisis of unexpected proportions, the Commission developed a novel approach to 
State aid in the banking and financial sector, applying for the first time since the institution of 
the European Economic Community to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.  Prior to the Commission’s 
first “financial crisis communication38” adopted on 13 October 2008, all State aid to banks 
and financial institutions had been approved under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.   This provision 
allows the granting of “aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities” 
provided that “such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to 
the common interest”.   Article 107(3)(c) TFEU has generally been interpreted as allowing the 
granting of aid to “firms in difficulty”39.   
 
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU have traditionally been applied to address “individual problems … 
[requiring] tailor made remedies which can be addressed under the rules for companies in 
difficulties”40 an approach that was ill suited to deal with the complexities of the financial 
crisis.  The test for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid under Article 107(3)(c) 
TFEU is in fact focused on the individual circumstances of the beneficiary and does not take 
into account the benefits the measure would have on the economy of the member State 
granting the aid as a whole. 
 
                                                          
36
 C 14/2008, Restructuring aid to Northern Rock [2008] OJ C 135/2008 
37
 NN 36/2008 Roskilde bank [2008] OJ C 238/2008 
38
 Banking communication 
39
 http://www.eftasurv.int/media/State-aid-guidelines/Part-III---Aid-for-rescuing-and-restructuring-firms-in-
difficulty.pdf 
40
 Case NN 25/2008 West LB, [2008]OJ C 189/03, para 42 
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The limits of the individual analysis required by the application of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU 
became evident when the Irish government, on 30 September 2008, announced a € 400 billion 
guarantee to Irish banks, which was put into place with immediate effect; i.e.  not following 
the “standstill principle”41.  The aid scheme was available to 6 banks only due to a criterion 
that the capital had to be mainly in the hands of Irish investors, non-Irish owned banks active 
in Ireland could thus not benefit from the aid.  Because of the general instability in the market 
at the time, this guarantee scheme had a severely distortive effect on the Irish banking sector.   
Irish customers rushed to move their funds to banks covered by the guarantee scheme and fled 
from banks, mainly based in Ireland and the UK, that were excluded by the guarantee
42
.  The 
guarantee scheme thus had a clear negative effect on banks that were not entitled to the aid as 
banks los costumers.  It also created an unbalance in the market giving Irish-owned banks an 
unfair competitive advantage.  Furthermore, it raised issues of discrimination due to its 
application based on the nationality of the majority shareholders of the banks
43
. 
 
The Irish guarantee scheme was high on the agenda on the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council (“ECOFIN”) meeting between the European finance ministers of 7 October 2008.  
The ministers attending the ECOFIN were determined to prevent “individual efforts” to deal 
with the crisis similar to those put in place by the Irish government with its guarantee scheme.  
The meeting resulted in a collective approach where the ministers agreed “to take all 
necessary measures” to restore confidence and proper functioning to the financial sector, and 
that public interventions where to be appropriately decided on a national level”.  They also 
called on the Commission to “act quickly” and to apply the rules “flexibly”, emphasising that 
interventions should be provided within a coordinated framework and on the basis of common 
principles
44
. 
 
While the conclusions of the ECOFIN did not elaborate on the exact meaning of the request 
for a flexible application of the EU State aid rules by the Commission, one can speculate that 
the governments of the EU member States expected the Commission to be more obliging of 
                                                          
41
 Case NN 48/2008 Guarantee scheme to banks in Ireland, [2008] OJ C 312/2008 para 5 
42
 Doley, p.8 
43
 After the notification on September 30, there was intensive contact between the Commission and the Irish 
authority due to the issues mentioned above.  Changes were made to prevent discrimination and limit distortion 
and negative spill-over.  The final scheme was submitted on October 12, 2008, and the Commission made its 
final approval on October 13, 2008, under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.  See Commission Press release IP/08/1497 
and Memo/08/615 
44
 “Immediate responses to the financial turmoil” ECOFIN Council Conclusions, 7 October 2008, 13930/08 
(Presse 284) 
15 
 
State aid than what the rules would normally allow for.  This interpretation seems to be 
confirmed by the Banking Communication, adopted only 6 days later, on 13 October, which 
indicated Article 107(3)(b) TFEU as the new statutory provision for the assessment of State 
aid to banks and financial institutions.   
 
The Commission however indicated that the change in legal basis for the assessment of State 
aid granted to banks and financial institutions was not to be used in all situations.  Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU in fact can be only be relied on where there is a risk of serious disturbance in 
the economy as a whole; “invoking this provision is possible only in genuinely exceptional 
circumstances where the entire functioning of financial markets is jeopardized”45.   
 
2.3 GRANTING AIR TO REMEDY A SERIOUS DISTURBANCE IN THE 
ECONOMY 
 
Article 107(3)(b) 
 
In order to analyse the application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU during the financial crisis, it is 
necessary to establish the general content of the articles. 
 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU provides that “aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of 
a Member State” may be compatible with the internal market.  Article 107(3)(b) TFEU does 
not provide a definition of aid but it is generally understood to refer to aid as defined by 
Article 107(1) TFEU. 
 
As mentioned above, Article 107(3)(b) TFEU provides that aid to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy may be compatible with the internal market and the use of the 
term “may” (as opposed to “is”) indicates that  this exception must be applied on a case-by-
case basis and following  a concrete and individual evaluation of each case.   It is important to 
point out that in order to benefit from the exception provided in Article 107(3)(b), the aid 
must be able to remedy the a threat to the entire economy and not only to shield from the 
effects of such threat its beneficiary or beneficiaries.  This was made clear by the Commission 
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in its decision concerning the Danish Guarantee scheme.  The Commission relying on the 
Court of First Instance’s case-law indicated that “Article 87(3)(b) EC [now Article107(3)(b) 
TFEU] needs to be applied restrictively and must tackle a disturbance in the entire economy 
of a Member State”46.  Furthermore, in the “WestLB” case (which was decided in April 2008) 
the Commission stressed that “[t]he Commission has consequently decided that a serious 
economic disruption is not remedied by an aid that "resolve[s] the problems of a single 
recipient [...], as opposed to the acute problems facing all operators in the industry.  "Also in 
all cases of banks in difficulty, the Commission has to date not relied on this provision [i.e.  
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU]”47. 
 
Turning now to what constitutes “a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State”, neither Article 107(3)(b) TFEU nor the Commission’s guidance papers offer a 
definition of this concept.  However, in BAWAG P.S.K decision from 2010, the 
Commission indicated that “the global financial crisis can create a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State and that measures supporting banks are apt to remedy this 
disturbance”.  In essence, the Commission seems to suggest that a perturbation of the 
financial markets, such as that caused by the financial crisis constitutes a serious disturbance 
in the economy.  This interpretation has been confirmed in the Banking Communication, the 
Recapitalisation Communication, the Impaired Asset Communication (IAC) and the 
Restructuring Communication adopted by the Commission
48
.  In the Banking Communication 
the Commission seems to suggest that there exist a serious disturbance in the economy since 
also sound banks are struggling financially
49
. 
 
In essence, the Commission has considered that in order for the exception provided in 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU to apply to healthy banks  encountering difficulties in accessing 
liquidity it is necessary that the shortage of funding must be so severe that it could result in 
the collapse of the banking sector which in turn due, to the banks’ crucial role in modern 
societies, could have a materially adverse systemic effect on the entire economy. 
Since it is the lack of liquidity in the market that has prompted the Commission to rely on 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU as legal basis for the granting of State aid to banks and financial 
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institutions, it seems unlikely that this provision will be relied on once the financial crisis has 
come to an end. 
Going back to the analysis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, the aid must “remedy” a disturbance in 
the economy.   The wording could be interpreted as implying that the aid must correct the 
disorder that justifies its approval, however this reading is too strict.  In order for the aid to be 
approved, the Commission in fact does not require the aid to remedy a disturbance, but only 
to be apt to remedy it
50
. 
 
Additional criterions 
 
In addition to the criterion in the articles, three specific conditions must be fulfilled for the aid 
to be compatible with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, these are: “Appropriateness”, “Necessity” and 
“Proportionality”51.  The first criteria involve that the aid has to be well targeted to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy.  If the disturbance could disappear without the measure 
or the measure is not appropriate to remedy the disturbance, this condition is not fulfilled. 
 
The next condition, necessity, means that the aid measure must, in amount and form, be 
necessary to remedy the disturbance in the economy.  To achieve this, the aid must be of the 
minimum amount necessary to reach the objective, and take the form most appropriate to 
remedy the disturbance.  If the objective could be reached with a smaller amount of aid or 
with a less distortive measure, the measure in question would not be necessary
52
. 
 
Last but not least, the aid must be proportional, meaning there must be a proper balance 
between the positive effect of the measure and the distortion of competition.  This also 
emerges from Article 3(1)(b) and 119 TFEU which provide that the European Union shall 
ensure the proper functioning of an internal market with free competition
53
.  State aid must 
therefore be limited to the minimal necessary to achieve its stated objectives, limiting 
consequential distortion of competition. 
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Applicability of the article 
 
The threshold for the application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU has traditionally been very high.  
Before the “Denmark Guarantee scheme54”, the last time Article 107(3)(b) TFEU was applied 
was in the 80s, when the Greek economy faced serious economic imbalance
55
, and the 
Community authorized specific exceptional measures aimed at correcting the situation.  As 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU has hardly ever been applied before the financial crisis, the limited 
existing case-law is of limited relevance when assessing the circumstances in which it could 
be applied. 
The wording of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU however indicates that it is aimed, among other, at 
being applied to the banking sector, the reason for this may be that a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a member State, is likely to occur in case of a shortage of money in the financial 
system.  In this respect, the Vice President of the Commission and Commissioner for 
Competition Policy, Commission, Joaquín Almunia has emphasized that the legal framework 
of Article 107(3)(b), was not meant for situations such as those stemming from the current 
financial crisis.  However, he also indicated but that the Commission, considering the crisis, 
had to make use of the instruments available and encouraged the Commission to develop 
regulations suited to address similar situations in the future
 56
.  That the Commission is 
currently working on such provisions, seems to confirm that Article 107(3)(b) is not the ideal 
legal instrument to address the current troubles of the financial sector. 
 
One of the reasons that may have led the Commission to clear the aid granted to banks and 
financial institutions on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) is probably that, as this Article has 
hardly ever been applied in the past, there Commission was not bound in its interpretation by 
past practices.  This has allowed the Commission the flexibility needed to adapt the 
interpretation of this provision so that it could be applied to the evolving financial crisis, and 
satisfy the request made by the ECOFIM to find a fast and flexible approach to deal with the 
aid granted to banks and financial institutions. 
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The Commission has adopted a number of communications and guidelines to set the rules for 
the application of Article 107(3)(b).  The communications, which have been adopted since 
October 2008, are specifically directed to the banking sector and are aimed at securing access 
to loans and liquidity in the market. 
 
2.3.1 GUIDELINES AND COMMUNICATIONS 
 
The Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in 
Difficulty 
 
Pursuant to paragraph 6 and 10 of the Banking Communication, the Commission has applied 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU consistently with the 2004 Community Guidelines on State Aid for 
Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty (the “R&R Guidelines”).  The R&R 
Guidelines clarify the Commission's approach in cases where the public authorities grant 
financial support to firms in difficulty. 
 
The Commission has indicated that it would not directly apply the R&R Guidelines to banks 
and financial institutions, but merely rely on their principles in the preparation of its 
communications laying out the principles that would guide its assessment of aid granted to 
banks and financial institutions
57
.  However, the Commission in its guidelines adopted after 
October 2008 has diverged from the principles set in the R&R Guidelines in three areas:  
 
- Rescue aid has been authorized for banks that are not classified as “in difficulty” 
- The procedural requirements have been simplified 
- The “one-time, last-time” rule has been abandoned 
 
(i) Rescue aid has traditionally been granted to “undertakings in difficulty”, defined as firms 
that are unable to stem their losses and that almost certainly set to go out of business in the 
short or medium term.  The R&R Guidelines in fact indicate  that States may grant rescue aid 
to a destitute firm with a view to its temporary survival provided that, within six months after 
the granting of the rescue aid, the aid is fully reimbursed, a restructuring plan is presented or 
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liquidation plan is notified to the Commission
58
.  Rescue aid is therefore a form of State 
support granted to firms in a situation of acute financial distress
59
.   
 
Pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, the Commission has authorized rescue or recapitalisation 
aid in the case of fundamentally sound financial institutions that were experiencing liquidity 
problems
60
.  There are several examples of healthy banks that have received aid.  Here we 
will only mention the case of the KBC group
61
.  The Commission found that the losses 
suffered by KBC were not threatening the solvency of the bank according to the applicable 
prudential norms but authorized the granting of aid because it found KBC’s solvency not to be 
reassuring in light of the importance of the bank in the Belgium economy. 
 
(ii) Furthermore, the Commission relaxed the procedure for the approval of aid granted to 
banks and financial institutions.  Due to the distortive nature of rescue and restructuring aid 
the Commission has to follow a complex procedure before it can make a final decision as to 
whether an aid is compatible with the internal market or not.  In this process the Commission 
must assess the potential effects that the aid may have on the recipients’ competitors who 
have the opportunity of raising their concerns and express their opinion on the potential 
distortive effects of the aid.  Thus, before rescue, restructuring or recapitalisation aid can be 
approved a wide range of issues must be examined by the Commission in what is usually a 
lengthy procedure. 
 
After the collapse of Leman Bothers, it was crucial to save the struggling banks and calm the 
market with swift interventions.  Rescue aid was thus approved efficiently and 
provisionally
62
, without too many questions being asked.  Procedure to approve aid, which 
normally took weeks, was cut to 24 hours due to the critical situation in the financial market.  
To mend this hasty procedure, the Commission examined restructuring plans
63
 six months 
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after they were provisionally authorized, once the acute fear for a collapse of the financial 
system had begun to decrease
64
. 
 
As a result of this fast-track procedure, competitors did not have the opportunity of providing 
their opinion on the aid before it was granted, and no thorough evaluation of its effects could 
be carried out.  Even if the Commission subsequently conducted in-depth investigations, this 
analysis was conducted ex-post once that the aid had already been granted and produced its 
effects on the market (including its distortive effects). 
 
The fast-track procedure has also resulted in a case that is an exception to the already 
exceptional approach developed by the Commission to deal with the financial crisis.  In the 
rescue of Fortis Bank, the Belgian Government carried out an emergency nationalization of 
the bank, separating Fortis Netherland from Fortis Bank
65
.  The nationalization was 
immediately followed by the sale of a 75% interest in the bank to BNP Paribas
66
, a large and 
healthy competitor who, the Belgian government, assumed would be able to facilitate, but not 
guarantee, the long-term viability of Fortis Bank Belgium.  The Commission authorized the 
aid in December 2008 allowing for the recapitalisation of the bank, temporary liquidity 
support and the creation of an entity resembling a “bad bank”.  In breach of the provisions of 
the R&R guidelines and the Banking Communication, a restructuring plan was never notified.   
As a result, the aid should normally been declared unlawful and reimbursable.  The 
Commission had however made an exception accepting that “Belgium has undertaken to 
submit to the Commission a restructuring plan for Fortis Bank [only] if at least one of the 
guarantees granted is called in”67. 
 
(iii) The last criteria of the Guidelines that has not been applied to banks and financial 
institutions is the “one-time, last time” rule; i.e. the rule establishing that aid may be granted 
only once during a period of 10 years
68
.  Between 2008 and 2011, various banks have in fact 
benefitted of two or more restructuring packages.  Traditionally the one-time, last time rule 
has been viewed as a key principle considering the distortive effect of the aid.  The 
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abandonment of this rule during the financial crisis has resulted in a far lenient allocation of 
aid and the granting of multiple aid packages to the same banks and financial institutions has 
a multiplied the distortive effect of the aid. 
 
Crisis Communications 
 
Banking communication 
 
In addition to the criteria explained in section 2.3, the ECOFIN Council adopted six additional 
common principles for State aid
69
, which were then implemented by the Commission in its 
Banking Communication of 13 October 2008. 
 
In particular, the Banking Communication indicates that: 
‒ aid measures should be non-discriminatory; this rule is aimed at making sure that 
eligibility to benefit of the aid is not based on nationality like in the case of the Irish 
scheme.   
‒ Access to aid should be limited in time, thus guarantee schemes can be authorized 
only for six months at a time, so that at the periodic review the Commission can 
request the member State adopting the aid to adjust or terminate it. 
‒ The aid should be clearly defined and limited in scope to what is necessary, without 
causing unjustified benefits for shareholders at the taxpayers’ expense. 
‒ An appropriate own-contribution should be provided to limit moral hazard, where the 
contribution should reflect the price paid by the beneficiary to the Member State for 
the aid.  This has proven particular difficult with winding-up aid combined with 
guarantee or other measures, as banks in need of winding-up often has little 
                                                          
69
 Economic and Finance Council (“ECOFIN”).  “Immediate responses to the financial turmoil” ECOFIN Council 
Conclusions, 7 October 2008, 13930/08 (Presse 284); 
- Intervention should be timely and the support should in principle be temporary 
- Member States will be watchful regarding the interests of taxpayers 
- Existing shareholders should bear the due consequences of the intervention 
- Member States should be in a position to bring about changes of management 
- The management should not retain undue benefits – governments may have inter alia the power to intervene 
in remuneration 
- Legitimate interest of competitors must be protected, in particular through the State aid rules 
- Negative spill-over effects should be avoided. 
23 
 
contribution to offer.  To mend to this problem winding-up aid cannot be combined 
with any new activity by the bank.   
Furthermore, the Guidelines provide for specific behavioural rules that apply to the 
beneficiaries of State aid, to prevent abuse of State support, has include ban on advertising 
State support and aggressive expansion
70
. 
 
Recapitalisation Communication 
 
Another significant change to State aid rules was introduced with the Recapitalisation 
Communication
71
 of December 5 2008.  Prior to the Recapitalisation Communication only 
banks facing financial difficulties could qualify for receiving State aid
72
 but, because 
financially sound banks also required liquidity due to the financial crisis, the Commission 
introduced the possibility of granting aid to banks that were not in financial distress.  The 
communication allows varying levels of remuneration and terms of the aid depending on the 
risk profile of the bank.  The level of remuneration for the aid must be set at a level that 
incentivizes exit from the aid scheme in case of sound banks.  The Communication instead 
requires n-sound banks to submit to the Commission a restructuring or liquidation plan which 
must include behavioural safeguards. 
 
Impaired Asset Communication 
  
By the beginning of 2009, the impact of the financial crisis on the economy was escalating 
requiring the Commission to further clarify and amend State aid rules.  The Commission 
published the Impaired Assets Communication
73
 on 25 February 2009.  One of the main 
features of the Impaired Assets Communication was that of setting a term, December 31, 
2010, for the application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU to banks and financial institutions.   The 
Commission’s decision to limit in time the application of Article 107(3)(b) clearly illustrates 
the exceptional nature of the policies that the Commission has adopted to face the financial 
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crisis.  The measures and practices put into place are in fact strictly linked to the crisis and 
would not be justified under different circumstances due to their distortive effect on 
competition
74
. The limitation in time also indicates that the changes made to the 
Commission’s decisional practice in the application of State aid rules do not represent a 
general liberalization of State aid, but only a temporary measure to make it possible to address 
the financial challenges raised by the economic crisis
75
. 
 
As to the impaired assets, in its Communication the Commission stressed that assets relief 
measures must be conditional on full transparency and disclosure on [the amount and nature 
of] the impaired assets and that Member States must take a coordinated approach to valuing 
assets and identifying assets eligible for relief.  To ensure the return to normal market 
condition, banks benefitting from the aid must submit to the Commission a restructuring plan 
within 3 months from accession to the relief program.  Final approval of the aid measures is 
granted only following the assessment of the restructuring plan. 
 
Restructuring Communication 
 
The Restructuring Communication was adopted on 14 August 2009, and is aimed at 
facilitating the restructuring of banks to ensure their long-term viability and financial stability.  
The restructuring should allow banks to cover all costs and provide adequate return to equity.  
Where restructuring is not an option, banks should windup or be separated into a “good bank” 
and “bad-bank” (the latter would contain all of the banks “toxic assets”).  Restructuring plans 
should cover a time frame of 5 years, 2 to 3 years more than what it typical under the “normal 
rules”. 
 
The Communication also provides that the viability of banks should be ensured through stress 
tests.  To limit distortion and moral hazard, restructuring should primarily be done through 
own and private investors’ resources. 
 
Post crisis measures 
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2011 
To facilitate the transition to normal market conditions, the Commission extended the 
applicability of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU until 31 December  2011 through a new 
communication
76
.  In parallel, new and permanent State aid rules based on Article 107(3)(c) 
TFEU and relating to the rescue and restructuring of banks in normal market conditions are 
being drafted and should, market conditions permitting, enter into force as of 1 January 
2012”77. 
 
Although the applicability of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU with its guidelines  have been 
prolonged, their application is subject to tighter conditions.  First, all recapitalisation aid or 
impaired asset measure granted after 1 January 2011, will require a restructuring plan which 
should be presented without delay.  Thus, the distinction between sound and un-sound banks 
has been removed in this area. 
 
2012 
On December 1, 2011, the Commission published a new Communication that extended the 
application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU (and of its guidelines) without providing for a revised 
expiration date.  The Authority will adopt an equivalent guideline before New Year. 
 
3.  THE AIM TO COUNTER DISTORTION OF 
COMPETITION 
 
3.1  COMPETITION, STATE AID AND BANKS 
 
The main goal of the EU and EEA competition policy on State aid is to protect competition in 
the internal market.  Under normal conditions inefficient banks would in the long period exit 
the market as part of a self-correcting mechanism that would promote the most efficient 
financial institutions.  The natural competition in the market in fact penalises banks that make 
inefficient choices about how they organise themselves, what risks they take, etc.  State aid to 
financial institutions in difficulty hinders this natural market adjustment mechanism and 
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produces a distortive unbalance.  Thus, aid measures should only be allowed subject to 
fulfilling of strict conditions
78
. 
 
Due to the close economic relationship between the EU and EFTA States, State aid can have 
an effect that can go beyond the national borders and there are three ways State aid  can 
adversely affect the internal market.  The first way is through a distortion of competition 
between member States.  If aids are not coordinated and unilaterally decided, (like the 
different levels of protection of bank accounts decided during October 2008, or the Irish bank 
scheme which was discussed above) differences in State decisions can introduce distortions in 
the market or provoke a subsidy race among Member States. 
 
Second, State aid creates a competitive unbalance between institutions that will receive State 
aid and those seeking capital at market conditions: the latter can be, and often are, penalized 
by the advantageous financing conditions granted to the former. 
 
Third, State aid can cause a distortion of competition among financial institutions benefitting 
of the aid.  If no differentiation is made in the conditions at which the aid is granted, financial 
institutions that have a high risk profile, due to their business model, will receive an 
advantage compared to other institutions that are also receiving aid but that are fundamentally 
sound and whose financial difficulties arise from the exceptional circumstances of the 
financial crisis.  As this is the aspect which most relates to competition law in the traditional 
sense, Section 3 of the thesis will mainly discuss cases on this last type of distortion. 
 
3.2 BALANCING COMPETITION AND STATE AID 
 
To ensure a well-functioning market where market participants are treated fairly, State aid 
policy must find a good balance between the benefits and distortions created by State aid. 
 
The State Aid Action Plan (“SAAP”)79, introduced by Commissioner Neelie Kroes in 2005, 
constitutes the blueprint for reform in the area of State aid and represents the foundation of 
the State aid regulations applied today.  One of the main contents of the SAAP is the so-called 
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balancing-test.  This test is based on economic principles and allows a meaningful assessment 
of the positive and negative implications of government aid
80
.  Although the action plan is not 
legally binding, it is nevertheless applied by the Commission and provides a good indication 
of how the Commission tries to strike the right balance between positive and distortive effects 
of State aid. 
 
The analytic framework of the SAAP test is based on three questions aimed at assessing 
whether the criteria mentioned in section 2.3 above - “appropriateness”, “necessity” and 
“proportionality” - are satisfied: 
 
- Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest?  
- Is the State aid measure an appropriate policy instrument - i.e. does the aid have an 
incentive effect and is the amount of the aid proportional?  
- Is the distortion of competition generated by the aid and its effect on trade limited, so that 
the aid’s overall balance is positive? 
 
In the remainder of this thesis we will focus on the analysis of some of the main 
[Commission/EFTA] decisions dealing with State aid granted to banks and financial 
institutions and discuss how the criteria mentioned above have been assessed.  Measures 
taken to limit distortion of competition and create a positive balance between the effect of 
State aid will be discussed in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
 
Appropriateness: is the aid measure aimed at achieving a well-defined objective of common 
interest? 
 
The first question the SAAP test raises is whether the aid is directed to remedy a market 
failure or another objective of common interest.  During the financial crisis Article 107(3)(b) 
TFEU has been used to remedy two different kinds of market failures: 
 
‒ First, aid has been aimed to prevent the failure of the financial market because of a 
lack of liquidity.   
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‒ Second, to limit the possible negative effect that the failure of a financial institution 
would have on other financial institutions. 
 
This approach raises additional questions: is ad hoc aid really targeted to prevent disturbance 
in the economy?  Are all banks of such importance or size that, if they fail, they can cause a 
failure in the financial market, or impose a negative effect on other banks?  Is recapitalisation 
aid to sound banks, not facing severe financial issues, really aimed at preventing the collapse 
of the financial markets?  These questions will be discussed below. 
 
 
Ad hoc aid – targeted to remedy a disturbance in the economy? 
 
The Commission has authorized the granting of State aid to banks and financial institutions on 
the basis of Article 107(3)(b) both when it was granted through an ad-hoc decision or a 
broader aid scheme, even though this provision is not  aimed at covering ad hoc measures.  In 
this respect, the Banking Communication states that “ad hoc interventions by Member States 
are not excluded in circumstances fulfilling the criteria”81 of Article 107(3)(b)”.  This 
suggests that while ad hoc interventions are not the Commission’s preferred approach, they 
can nevertheless be put into place when necessary.  Almost all of the 76 decisions adopted by 
the Commission approving ad hoc aid have dealt with large and important banks the failure of 
which could have caused a serious disturbance in the economy.  In essence, State intervention 
through ad hoc measures was appropriate and necessary where suitable broad aid schemes 
where not possible. 
 
What then with small, less important banks?  In the case regarding the granting of rescue and 
restructuring aid to a small Spanish bank, Caja Castilla-La Mancha (“CCM”)82, the Spanish 
government stated that the disorderly bankruptcy of CCM would have a severe effect which 
could undermine the confidence of depositors in other “cajas de ahorros” (saving banks), as 
well as affect the regional market where the bank is present.  The Spanish government further 
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argued that the bankruptcy of CCM could have created significant difficulties for other saving 
banks and could also have a domino effect on the financial market.   
 
In its decision, the Commission does not discuss the size of the bank, the opinion of the 
Spanish government or the banks potential to affect the economy
83
.  The Commission only 
acknowledged that the global financial crisis can create a serious disturbance in the economy 
of a Member State and that measures supporting banks are apt to remedy such a disturbance.   
Furthermore, the Commission indicates that the approvals granted to the various measures 
adopted by the Spanish authorities confirm its aptness to combat the financial crisis
84
.  The 
approach of the Commission suggests that it relied to a large extent on the evaluations of the 
Spanish government, rather than on its own analysis.  However, this is not how Commission 
would normally operate, but such an approach has been adopted by necessity as it allows to 
approve State aid in the short timeframe that the financial crisis allows.  One can conclude 
that the Commission in its approach does not make a noticeable distinction between ad hoc 
interventions and schemes. 
 
Even with hindsight, it is difficult to determine whether the bankruptcy of a small bank 
actually could have caused a disturbance in the market.  However, as the relevant criteria to 
approve the aid under art 107(3)(b) TFEU is that the aid only needs to be apt to remedy a 
disturbance,  the application of this provision to small banks seems justified by the general 
instability in the financial market even when granted with an ad hoc measure.   
 
Can small banks create a disturbance in the economy? 
 
In its decision regarding the Danish Max Bank AS
85
 (“Max Bank”), the Commission stated 
that “the financial crisis has created exceptional circumstances in which the bankruptcy of one 
bank, [even a bank of small size, such as Max Bank], may undermine trust in the financial 
system.  […] It is particularly so in the case of a small economy such as Denmark where 
counterparts may tend not to distinguish between individual banks, thus extending the lack of 
confidence generated by the failure of one bank to the whole sector”86. 
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In its Max Bank decision, the Commission does not look closely on the actual potential of a 
bankruptcy of Max Bank to disturb the economy, but concludes that a small bank may cause 
market failure in a small economy like the Danish one.  The Commission thus approved the 
aid on the grounds that the bankruptcy of a bank might create a general distrust in the banking 
system; “[g]iven the great uncertainty due to the financial crisis and the necessity of external 
funding for the Danish banking sector, a lack of confidence in the Danish financial system 
could severely affect the whole Danish economy”87.  Considering the distortive effect rescue 
aid impose on competition, one may question if the Commission goes a bit too far in this case.  
Especially since Article 107(3)(b) TFEU should be applied restrictively and must tackle a 
disturbance in the entire economy of a Member State
88
. 
 
Furthermore; if the approval of aid granted to a small bank is based on its potential to distort 
the economy in a small market, one can wonder on what ground the Commission approved on 
November 22, 2011 the aid of EUR 1 billion granted to the small Spanish Banco the 
Valencia
89
. In fact, Spain has a significantly bigger financial market than Denmark, and the 
argument supporting the Commission’s decision in the Max Bank case therefor do not apply 
here.  Thus, if one can question if the Commission went too far in the decision regarding Max 
Bank, the question may certainly be raised in this case.  The Spanish market is under strong 
financial distress and it is therefore thinkable that the Commission applied the provision extra 
flexible in this case to prevent extended distrust in the Spanish market which has been 
generally accepted as a legitimate reason. 
 
The collapse of a small bank is not likely to create a big risk for the market as a whole, but 
due to the instability in the financial market generated by the financial crisis it has been 
considered in the common interest to restore confidence in the stability of the baking system 
which would be disrupted in case of failure of a bank.  Furthermore, aid to banks of minor 
importance generally causes a limited distortive effect in the market, especially considering 
the high price the banks must pay for the aid and the restrictions on its commercial behavior 
that it must accept. 
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Is recapitalisation of sound banks apt to prevent disturbance in the economy? 
 
The NOK 50 billion Norwegian scheme for temporary recapitalisation of fundamentally 
sound banks in Norway was found to be compatible with Article 61(3)(b) EEA in May 
2009
90
.  Almost all banks in Norway at the time had a core capital ratio of 7 % or more
91
.   
The scheme was applicable for banks having a core capital in excess of 6 % and was aimed at 
strengthening it to 10 - 12 % depending on the bank’s risk profile. 
 
The Norwegian banks that benefitted from the aid were not in financial difficulties, yet they 
had restricted lending thus creating financial difficulties to the Norwegian economy.  The 
Norwegian aid scheme was implemented, in accordance with the Recapitalisation 
Guidelines
92
, to encourage banks to increase their lending.  The scheme was thus aimed to 
remedy a market failure and to remedy a serious disturbance in the Norwegian economy.   
One may wonder whether the Norwegian scheme was necessary, this will be discussed below 
in the section on the “necessity” criteria.   
 
Necessity; is there an incentive effect and is the aid amounted proportional? 
 
The second question the SAAP test raises is if the aid measure is necessary
93
.  For the 
measure to be necessary it must represent an appropriate instrument to remedy a disturbance 
in the economy and better instruments must not be available.  This criterion also requires the 
aid to have an incentive effect so that the same change in behaviour could not be obtained 
without the aid. 
 
The Norwegian bank scheme 
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As the Norwegian banks were in a strong financial situation and had a relatively high core 
capital when the aid scheme was introduced, a guarantee scheme might have been sufficient 
to bring Norwegian banks to increase their lending activity.  One could also wonder whether 
the Norwegian aid scheme was too extensive; the current EU requirement is for all European 
banks to have a core capital of at least 9% by 2012.  Was it then necessary (and compatible 
with the internal market) to introduce a recapitalisation scheme that aims at bringing the core 
capital of Norwegian banks to 10-12 %? 
 
The Commission in the Danish guarantee scheme decision indicated that aid is not necessary 
“if a lesser amount of aid or a measure in a less distortive form (e.g.  a guarantee instead of a 
capital injection) were sufficient to remedy a serious disturbance in the entire economy.”  
Pursuant to this approach, one wonders whether it would have been less distortive to 
introduce an aid scheme to bring the core capital to a figure lower than 10-12 % 
(supplemented by a guarantee scheme, if necessary) rather than an extensive recapitalisation 
aid. 
 
The decision to approve the Norwegian aid scheme was based on the evaluation made by the 
financial supervisory authority of Norway on the amount of capital necessary to bring banks 
to lend.    Several recapitalisation schemes
94
, including the Danish recapitalisation scheme 
which was adopted only days after the Norwegian scheme, have been implemented to 
increase the core capital up to 10-12 % depending on the risk profile of the bank.  This 
suggests that the various recapitalization schemes are the result of a coordinated effort by the 
various national authorities. 
 
It is important to point out that the core capital requirement of 9 % was introduced after the 
Norwegian scheme was approved, thus this requirement could not be used as a point of 
reference for the decision.  The Commission has adopted schemes after the introduction of the 
9% core capital requirement in which it indicated that it may be necessary to strengthen the 
banks’ core capital beyond the minimum required. 
 
Rescue aid when it is unlikely the rescue attempt will succeed 
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One may also question if rescue aid is necessary and justified when it is likely that the rescue 
attempt will not succeed, or when other measures such as a winding-down
95
 or some form of 
liquidity assistance
96
 could be introduced
97
. 
 
Looking at Commission decisions regarding aid granted to Dexia, Anglo Irish Bank and Hypo 
Real Estate it seems that the fact that the State aid is directed at “remedying a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State” is more important than the possibility of 
actually rescuing the banks. 
 
All three banks mentioned above have received rescue / recapitalisation aid and then were 
nationalized and now have been wound up or are in the process of being wound up.  The 
granting of aid to banks and financial institutions has been justified on the basis of their key 
role in the economy and the very serious disturbance they would cause if they were to fail.  
These arguments appear all the more true having regard of the nationalization of Dexia, Anglo 
Irish Bank and Hypo Real Estate which suggests that the Belgian, UK and German 
governments recognized the systemic importance of the banks. 
 
Pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU aid can be authorized in order to prevent a deterioration 
of the stability of the economy
98
.  In the decisions it has also been highlighted that the 
recipient of rescue and recapitalisation aid should be encouraged and stimulated to become 
independent from the Government granting the aid in order to reduce the likeliness of 
distortions of competition.   
 
When an institution is of such importance that it qualifies for State aid, then that institution 
should be given the opportunity to be rescued.  When it is clear that a rescue is not possible 
supplementary assistance, such as a controlled winding down, should be introduced.  A hasty 
process where important banks were directly wound up in a non-controlled manner would not 
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only “trigger an immediate loss of jobs, but also serious disturbances and repercussions which 
could further jeopardize the stability of the economy”99. 
 
As we have seen, the aid measures approved pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU raise a 
number of issues.  However, all aid measures to banks and financial institutions since 2008, 
with one exception, have been approved.   In three decisions the aid has been approved 
subject to conditions.  Overall in 398 out of 399
100
 cases the Commission has approved the 
aid
101
.  One wonders whether the Commission has actually assessed the effects of the aid in 
each case, or acted so quickly that aid has been approved irrespective of its effect on 
competition. 
 
3.2.1 LIMITING THE DISTORTION OF COMPETITION 
 
Through its “crisis communications”, the Commission has introduced several safeguard 
measures and conditions to limit the distortion of competition in the internal market that could 
result from aid granted to banks and financial institutions.  In the case of guarantee schemes, 
the Commission introduced a number of restrictions that apply to the beneficiary of the aid, 
including on their commercial conduct through market share ceilings, to the size of the 
balance-sheet and other behavioural constraints that may be needed to achieve the purpose of 
the guarantee.   
 
As regards recapitalisation schemes, safeguard measures include the limiting of capital 
injection to the minimum necessary and prohibiting the beneficiary from engage in aggressive 
commercial strategies that would be incompatible with the underlying objectives of the 
recapitalisation
102
.  The Commission introduced a number of conditions common to all the 
guidelines, namely all measures should be temporary, objective, necessary, non-
discriminatory and proportionate. 
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The safeguard measures however are not problem-free and raise a number of issues, such as 
that of finding appropriate monitoring systems.  Furthermore, certain restrictions, such as 
those relating to the growth of undertakings, may facilitate anticompetitive conduct.   
 
During the financial crisis market has been highly illiquid, resulting in a situation where 
market prices can no longer be tied to the value of fundamentals
103
.  Since there is no standard 
procedure for market-to-market accounting when markets do not work properly, this creates 
and uncertainty as to the possibility of preventing a distortion of competition. 
 
Proportionality – is the overall balance positive? 
 
The communications discussed in section 2.3.1 all provide for different financial and 
behavioural measures to minimise or avoid distortion of competition in order to obtain a 
positive balance between the benefits and distortion of competition arising from the aid.   
 
To achieve the necessary balance between benefits generated by aid measures and the 
distortion of competition they cause, the Commission and the Authority have distinguished 
between “good aid” and “bad aid.”  Aid that meets the proportionality test and that addresses 
financial markets breakdown or crisis of confidence is generally just sufficient to return 
structurally sound banks to viability and is considered to be “good aid”.  Aid in excess of 
good aid has been needed, not due to the failure of the financial markets, but because of 
excessively risky investments made by banks.   This latter type of aid is labelled as “bad aid” 
as it usually cannot be justified because of the distortion of competition that it entails.   
 
In the Recapitalisation Communication the Commission applies the good aid/bad aid 
approach to distinguish between banks, allowing recapitalisation schemes under different 
conditions based on the risk-profile of the bank.  The principle applied is that fundamentally 
sound banks whose problems are mainly due to the financial crisis should pay less revenue 
than banks with a high risk profiles
104
.  The aim of this measure is to prevent the granting of 
an undue competitive advantage to distressed or underperforming banks.   
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A systematic approach to distinguish good aid and bad aid based on the risk-profile of the 
bank consists in distinguishing between three types of situations
105
. 
 
- Banks and financial institutions whose failure would pose a systemic risk threatening the 
stability of the financial sector as a whole. 
- Banks and financial institutions which are in danger, merely as victims of the collapse of 
other banks 
- And finally, financial institutions who are in trouble because they took reckless risk or 
where poorly managed 
 
In most decisions we find that banks have fallen within more than one of these categories.  
State aid granted to banks in the first group is clearly within the scope of measures adopted to 
“remedy disturbance in the economy”.  Aid to banks in the second group may or may not fall 
within the scope of measures adopted to “remedy disturbance in the economy” depending on 
its size and importance.  Since the difficulties of the banks falling in the second group are not 
caused by mismanagement, but the lack of liquidity, a rescuing of these banks are in principle 
lawful as they under normal condition would not exit the market.  Actual distortive features 
must be determined on a case-to-case basis. 
 
  
Dexia bank
106
 
 
Dexia bank offers a good example of a bank falling within the two first situations.  Dexia, 
which is also mentioned above
107
, is a financial group who received its first State guarantee in 
November 2008.  Because of its size, the Commission recognised that its failure would have 
created a systemic risk for the Belgian banking sector, thus the aid granted to this banks is 
highly necessary because if the external effects that their failure might entail
108
, and therefore 
it can be granted to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy”.   
 
The aid was likely to have a highly distortive effect on competition, but was granted 
following a balancing of the benefits and disadvantages of the aid.  Measures were taken, like 
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limiting the guarantee to Dixia’s refinancing needs, with a maximum maturity of three years, 
which should limit Dexia’s possibilities to increase its position in the market.  Dexia also 
committed to waive advertisement of its status as a bank with State guarantee, limit growth of 
its balance sheet, and not to offer remuneration conditions to private individuals as the 
guarantee would have caused exceptionally good rates. 
 
Norther Rock 
 
Banks in danger due to reckless risk and poor management offer no economic nor legal 
rationale to save.  Aid granted in these circumstances would be highly distortive on 
competition.  Some banks in this category are however of such a size and importance, that 
their failure could have an external effect.  Even though the rescue or restructuring of the bank 
would be highly distortive on competition, it might still be justified as saving the market as 
such will weigh heavier than its anticompetitive effect.   
 
Northern Rock is an example of such a bank.   Before its troubles started in the second half of 
2007 Northern Rock was the 5
th
 biggest UK mortgage bank.  In the decision evaluating under 
Article 10(3)(c) TFEU
109
 the restructuring plan
110
 presented after the granting of rescue aid to 
Northern Rock,  the Commission observed “that the problems of NR are due to specific 
(risky) activities of significant size compared to the overall size of the bank.  Therefore, the 
present case seems rather to be based on individual problems, and thus requires tailor made 
remedies, which can be addressed under the rules for companies in difficulties”111.   
 
Northern Rocks dependence on wholesale funding caused difficulties in the second half of 
2007 when the mortgage securitization market collapsed.  The funding problems led the UK 
authorities to provide loans and guarantees which were approved as rescue aid until 17 March 
2008.  Following this rescue a comprehensive restructuring was initiated, including the 
division of the bank into BankCo and AssetCo.  Due to its broad scope and distortive features 
the restructuring plan was subject to an in-depth, and extended in-depth investigation, as in a 
number of areas the Commission did not agree that the conditions were sufficient to justify 
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the distortion on competition.  The plan was finally accepted in October 2009, almost two 
years after the aid was granted.   
 
Having regard of competition considerations only, Northern Rock should have been 
wounded-up rather than restructured.  Thus, an extensive list of nine conditions to limit 
distortion of competition were included in the restructuring plan
112
.  One of these conditions 
was the separation of BankCo and AssetCo, which in itself would limit the distortion of 
competition as these banks would not be among UKs leading banks.   
 
When comparing Dexia and Northern Rock, it is clear that the prior had a more legitimate 
reason to be rescued than the latter as its rescue was less distortive on competition.  Northern 
Rock is however subject to very stringent conditions which should, at least to some extent, 
redress the anticompetitive effects of the aid it received.   
 
Even though a number of measures were taken to limit distortion of competition in the two 
cases, the aid nevertheless had a distortive nature.  Distorted competition is more beneficial 
for competitors than a potential collapse of the market, thus the aid was considered 
compatible as it was apt to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy”.   
 
This approach allows to minimise distortion of competition when States can distinguish 
between “good” and “bad” aid, and on that basis impose appropriate aid measures and 
conditions.  However, it can be extremely difficult to distinguish which banks fall in to which 
group when operating under serious time pressure.  Some banks may also fall in more than 
one category, as it is demonstrated by the two examples mentioned above, making it difficult 
to determine if the bank should be granted aid or not.  The approach is also problematic as it 
has been necessary to rescue and recapitalise banks in the last category, like Northern Rock, 
due to the potential effect of their failure.  Even though such banks in many cases have 
received aid at less favourable conditions to limit the distortive effect, this has not always 
been possible, as some banks were in a financial situations that did not allowed such 
conditions.  Thus, in the aim to save the economy, aid has been granted despite its distortive 
effect on the competition. 
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3.2.2 CORRECTING UNDUE DISTORTION OF COMPETITION 
 
Banks may receive aid, which is considered incompatible with the internal market.  This can 
be either because (i) the aid is granted without prior notification and approval from the 
Commission or the Authority, (ii) the aid is granted while subject to in-depth investigation to 
determine its lawfulness (iii) the aid has been granted under certain conditions, which are not 
being fulfilled, or (iiii) because has been found incompatible with the internal market by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union or the EFTA Court.   
 
Lack of prior notification 
 
Aid of the first kind is not necessarily incompatible with the internal market, and thus 
unlawful, but the procedure for lawfully granting the aid has been breached
113
.  The 
consequences of a breach of the procedural rules are not severe, the Commission or the 
Authority will conduct an assessment and come to a view as to whether the aid is compatible 
with the internal market.  Where the aid is found to be incompatible, it must be recovered by 
the State that has granted it.  Member States cannot be sanctioned for a breach of procedural 
regulations.   
 
Once they are informed that an aid has been granted or even ex officio, the Commission or the 
Authority will open an investigation into the aid in question and request detailed information 
about the measure.  For instance, this has been the case with the aid granted by the Icelandic 
authorities to their three main banks, Glitnir Bank, Kaupthing Bank and Landsbanki, the 
Authority opened formal investigations to determine the compatibility of the aid.  These cases 
are still pending, but the possible outcome will either be that the Authority determines that the 
aid is (i) compatible with the internal market, (ii) compatible under certain conditions, or (iii) 
partly or fully incompatible so that the aid must be recovered in whole or in part from the 
banks. 
 
In-depth investigation 
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The rescue aid to Dexia is an example of aid granted while an investigation was pending.   In 
the case of Dexia, the Commission approved the granting of State aid in a very quick 
procedure which gave Dexia a financial advantage over its competitors.  To determine if the 
aid would actually restore Dexia to long-term viability, while causing minimum distortion to 
the market, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation when granting the aid.  This 
procedure has been used in many similar cases.  Such in-depth investigations have allowed 
the Commission to immediately approve the aid, and later to determine the conditions and 
lawfulness of the aid. 
 
Recovery of the aid 
 
The aid granted to Banco Privado Português (“BPP”), a Portuguese bank, is a good example 
of aid approved subject to conditions.  A rescue aid had been cleared, under the condition that 
a restructuring plan would have been presented within six month from the approval of the aid.  
The plan was not presented, and the Commission opened a formal investigation to evaluate 
the aid, finding it incompatible with the internal market as it caused an undue distortion of 
competition.  To correct the distortion, the Commission concluded that the aid had to be 
recovered from the bank in accordance with Article 7(5) and 14(1) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 659/1999
114
. 
 
Court 
 
In the BPP case, in which as mentioned above, the Commission ordered the recovery of the 
aid.  The bank has introduced an action for the annulment of the Commission’s decision 
which is currently pending before the General Court
115
.  This is the first and only decision 
regarding Article 107(3)(b) that having been brought before the General Court.  A 
Commission decision can also be challenged by the State or the competitors of the recipient of 
the aid.  Since the only decision regarding Article 107(3)(b) that has been brought before the 
court is the action for annulment by BPP one may conclude either that banks have not found 
aid measures to be unduly distortive to competition, or that the general fear of a collapse of a 
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bank, has opened for a greater acceptance of distortion of competition, because of the 
seriousness of the situations.  We would propend for the later assumption. 
 
 
 
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It has been claimed that the Commission by applying the rescue and restructuring principles 
in combination with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU to the review of financial crisis aid has made a 
master stroke
116
.  The decision to apply Article 107(3)(b) TFEU  has allowed the Commission 
to interpret this rule adapting it to the particular political and economic circumstances of the 
banking crisis when identifying what types of government assistance it would regard as 
acceptable and on what terms.
117
.  Applying the R&R principles has helped limit the 
distortive effect of the aid on competition, due to the strict implementation plan the banks are 
required to submit, and the restrictions in granting extensions of the aid schemes or other acts 
that would further distort competition. 
 
The severity of the financial crisis has created strong political pressure to grant aid, making it 
virtually unthinkable that the approval of rescue aid would be refused.  Had such aid been 
approved with a permanent nature, it would have meant a de facto suspension of the EU and 
EEA State aid rules.  Through the application of the principles of the R&R guidelines, the 
Commission and the Authority have efficiently, flexibly yet provisionally approved rescue aid 
to secure the stability of the financial system, while making the final approval of the aid 
conditional upon a positive evaluation of a restructuring plan
118
.   
 
It is important to point out that one cannot simply assume that because aid was granted and 
some banks needed aid more than others, distortion of competition in the market arouse.  
Given the systemic nature of the crisis and the specific features of the financial markets, any 
distortion of competition arising from the aid is likely to have been limited and mostly related 
to moral hazard.  Aid has been approved in all cases except one, and few market competitors 
have complained about the distortive nature of the financial support granted to certain banks.  
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Furthermore, most of the banks that could opt out from rescue, restructuring or 
recapitalisation schemes have done so, suggesting that the schemes actually do not confer an 
advantage over competitors, given the strings and conditions attached to them.  It is however 
also possible that the competitors of aid beneficiaries have not complained due to the fear that 
if aid were not granted the financial stability of the banking system would have been put in 
jeopardy. 
 
Most of the recapitalisation aid granted during the financial crisis has been granted through 
recapitalisation schemes to sound banks.  These are banks that under normal market 
conditions would not be struggling.  When such aid is granted in a non-discriminatory way it 
is not likely to have strong distortive effect. 
 
That said, it is impossible to grant rescue or restructuring aid without distorting the 
competition, as inefficient banks normally should quit the market.  One may therefore argue 
that the expansion of the possibility of granting State aid, through Article 107(3)(b) TFEU has 
resulted in a lenient assessment thus causing a significant distortion of competition.  This is 
especially true for the decision to accept a merger between two Icelandic banks, Byr and 
Islandsbanki.  Both banks had received aid, which under normal condition would prevent 
Islandsbanki from buying its competitor, Byr.  The Authority has in any even found the 
merger compatible with Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement because it could have the 
effect of stabilizing the banking market. 
  
Without the reliance on a new legal basis, aid to banks and financial institutions could have 
not been granted in such a large scale and as quickly as it has been.  The extensive recourse to 
aid has however helped preserve the stability of the financial system and avoided that the 
failure of a bank could have a domino effect on other banks.  The benefits of the aid on 
competitors have thus been greater than those that could have resulted from aid granted under 
the “normal” rules. 
 
By distinguishing between fundamentally sound banks and un-sound banks, the 
communications have allowed the approval of aid in a way that minimizes the distortion of 
competition.  The Commission and the Authority have accepted that “illiquid but otherwise 
fundamentally sound financial” players deserve a more lenient attitude than those who needed 
43 
 
to be rescued by the State as a result of their specific business model, excessive risk taking or 
inefficiency
119
. 
 
Through this distinction, the regulations allow and legalize discrimination between banks that 
have financial problems due to the financial crisis and those that have operational problems 
for other reasons.  This distinction is justified due to general competition considerations.  
Banks struggling because of their specific business model, risk taking etc., should normally 
quit the market which means that the rescuing would be highly distortive on competition.  
Banks that are fundamentally sound are, on the other hand, only struggling due to the general 
lack of liquidity.  The rescue of these institutions does not represent the same threat to 
competition than the rescue of inefficient banks.  Furthermore, should these institutions not 
receive temporary access to financing the collapse of the market would be more than a simple 
risk. 
 
In conclusion, to what extent should then State aid to banks and financial institutions be 
allowed in the future?  And to what extent is distortion of competition acceptable?  Based on 
the balancing-test no there is no definitive answer to these questions.  It all depends on the 
balancing of the benefits and negative effects of the aid. 
 
State aid for rescuing and restructuring has given rise to some of the most controversial State 
Aid cases and is among the most distortive type of State aid.  It cannot be the norm that a 
company who gets into financial difficulties is rescued by the State.  Hence, the general 
principle of the prohibition of State aid should remain the rule and derogation from that rule 
should be limited
120
.  Furthermore, under normal market conditions it would not be justified 
for the State to recapitalise sound banks so that such aid should also be avoided. 
 
How far central banks and governments should intervene and how far distortion of 
competition should be permitted, ultimately depends on how relevant a financial institutions is 
for the financial system
121
. 
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